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I.

Introduction
Mortgage securitization, subprime lending, a persistently weak housing market,
and an explosion of residential mortgage defaults – today’s homeowners and banks
face a new and challenging landscape. Recently, courts in several states have issued
decisions that alter the terrain for mortgage foreclosures. In Massachusetts, New
Jersey, and New York, among other states, courts have dismissed foreclosure actions on
the basis of what might seem to be highly technical deficiencies in the pleading or
proof. The most well-known – and controversial – in this cluster of cases is U.S. Bank
National Ass’n v. Ibanez,1 decided by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
this year. In Ibanez, the court held that two assignee banks failed to obtain legal title to
foreclosed properties because they failed to prove that they held valid assignments of
the foreclosed mortgages at the moment that the foreclosure proceedings were begun.
The apparent attitude of the courts in these cases can be best summarized by the
statement of a New York judge in a comparable context: that courts will not be mere
“automatons mindlessly processing paper motions in mortgage foreclosure actions[,]
most of which proceed on default.”2 Rather, in these cases, courts have held banks,
other lenders, and securitized trusts to strict proof of what might otherwise seem to
be fairly inferred facts and contractual obligations.
Are these decisions best seen as misguided attempts to temporarily save homeowners (and others) from the pain of foreclosure actions – delays that waste judicial and
litigants’ time – when we consider that these foreclosures will, in any event, eventually
occur? Or are they justified decisions which establish substantive norms that the real
conditions of real estate financing in the twenty-first century demand?
In this Issue Brief, we maintain that the decisions in these cases are not extreme
examples of judicial hyper-technicality run amok. Rather, they are attempts to address the radically new foreclosure realities in the age of mortgage securitization and
subprime lending – realities that existing laws, on many levels, are inadequate to
address.
II. The Cases in Question: Ibanez and Others
The Ibanez case was actually two cases, consolidated for hearing. Both dealt with
foreclosure actions against homeowners whose mortgages were securitized, prior to
foreclosure, through a series of complicated transactions.
*
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In the first case, Antonio Ibanez borrowed $103,500 for the purchase of a home in
Springfield, Massachusetts. The lender was Rose Mortgage, and the loan was secured
by a mortgage which listed Ibanez as the mortgagor and Rose as the mortgagee. The
mortgage was recorded with the local registry of deeds.3
Several days later, Rose executed an assignment of this mortgage in blank – that is,
with no specification of the party to whom it would be transferred. At some point, the
name “Option One Mortgage Corporation” was stamped in the blank space, as the
assignee. This assignment was recorded. After the stamping, but before recording,
Option One executed an assignment of the mortgage in blank. According to U.S.
Bank, the mortgage was eventually assigned to: Lehman Brothers Bank, FSB; then to
Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc.; then to Structured Asset Securities Corporation; and,
ultimately pooled with approximately 1,220 other mortgage loans and assigned to
U.S. Bank as trustee for the Structured Asset Securities Corporation Mortgage PassThrough Certificates, Series 2006-Z. This transaction effectively converted the mortgages into mortgage-backed securities that were sold to investors (a process known as
securitization).4
On July 5, 2007, U.S. Bank foreclosed on the Ibanez property through a statutorily
granted power of sale. Under Massachusetts law, a mortgage holder does not have to
obtain judicial authorization to foreclose on a mortgaged property, if the power to
foreclose is granted by the mortgage itself.5 The entity holding the mortgage need
only publish notice of intent to foreclose and send notice by registered mail to the
property owner of record. At the foreclosure sale, U.S. Bank purchased the Ibanez
property for itself. The purchase price was significantly less than the amount of the
outstanding debt and the estimated market value of the property.6
In September, 2008 – more than a year later – U.S. Bank brought an action in court
to quiet title to the Ibanez property. In particular, U.S. Bank sought a declaration that
any right, title, or interest of the mortgagor (Ibanez) had been extinguished by the
foreclosure sale, and that title was vested in the Bank.7
The case that was consolidated with Ibanez for hearing followed a similar pattern.
In that case, Mark and Tammy LaRace gave a mortgage for property in Springfield,
Massachusetts to Option One Mortgage Corporation on May 19, 2005. The mortgage was security for a $103,200 loan. The mortgage was recorded in the local registry
of deeds on that day. One week later, Option One executed an assignment of the
LaRace mortgage in blank. It was later claimed that the mortgage was assigned to
Bank of America on July 28, 2005, as part of a flow sale and servicing agreement.
Bank of America was later claimed to have assigned it to Asset Backed Funding
Corporation (ABFC) in an October 1, 2005 mortgage loan purchase agreement. ABFC
later pooled the mortgage with others and assigned it to Wells Fargo as trustee for the
group of now securitized mortgages.8
On July 5, 2007, Wells Fargo foreclosed on the LaRace mortgage, using the same
statutory power of sale as used in the Ibanez case. At the foreclosure sale, Wells Fargo
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Ibanez, 941 N.E.2d at 45-46.
See id. at 46.
See id. at 49; Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 244, § 14 (2011).
See Ibanez, 941 N.E.2d at 44, 47.
See id. at 44.
See id. at 47-48.
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purchased the LaRace property for itself. The purchase price was more than the outstanding debt, but significantly less than the property’s estimated market value.9
In October of 2008 – more than year after the foreclosure sale – Wells Fargo brought
a quiet title action, requesting a court declaration that any right, title, or interest that
the LaRaces had in the property was extinguished, and a declaration that title was
vested in Wells Fargo.10
In both cases, the mortgagors – Ibanez and the LaRaces – did not initially answer
the complaints in the quiet title actions, and U.S. Bank and Wells Fargo moved for
entry of default judgments against them. At a case management conference, a judge
of the Massachusetts Land Court raised the issue of whether U.S. Bank and Wells
Fargo were entitled to foreclose on the properties in view of the fact that the assignments of the mortgages to them were not executed or recorded until after the foreclosure complaints were filed and the foreclosure sales were held.11 In other words, although U.S. Bank and Wells Fargo represented in the notices for the foreclosure sales
that they were the mortgage holders, they – in truth – had not yet been assigned the
mortgages. The assignment to U.S. Bank was executed more than one year after the
foreclosure sale in the case of the Ibanez property, and the assignment to Wells Fargo
was executed ten months after the foreclosure sale, in the LaRace case. (The court
found that this was true, even though the La Race assignment to Wells Fargo declared
a date that preceded the foreclosure sale.) The explanation for this state of affairs in
both cases was that “the use of postsale assignments was customary in the industry.”12
The legal question, thus, was whether an entity which claimed that it was the legal
holder of a mortgage at the time of foreclosure, but – in fact – could not prove that it
was, could foreclose because the mortgage was proven to have been later assigned to
it. The appellate court held that it could not. Stressing the power that the statutory
scheme grants to mortgage holders – i.e., the power to foreclose without judicial oversight – the court held that “one who sells under a power [of sale] must follow strictly
its terms”.13 The court noted that “[o]ne of the terms of the power of sale . . . is the
restriction on who is entitled to foreclose.”14 Only a party who is a present legal holder of a mortgage, or his agent, may exercise the power of sale. “Any effort to foreclose
by a party lacking ‘jurisdiction and authority’ to carry out a foreclosure under these
statutes is void.”15
For U.S. Bank and Wells Fargo “to obtain the judicial declaration of clear title that
they [sought] . . . they had to prove their authority to foreclose under the power of sale
and show their compliance with the requirements on which this authority rests.”16
Having failed to do so, they failed to demonstrate that they acquired good title to the
properties.17
What is not apparent from this bare-bones narrative is the state of the real estate
paperwork in these cases. In the Ibanez case, among other facts, the assignment of the
mortgage to U.S. Bank was claimed to have occurred pursuant to a trust agreement,
9
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See id. at 44, 48.
See id. at 44.
See id.
See id. at 45, 49, 54.
See id. at 49-50 (quoting Moore v. Dick, 72 N.E. 967 (Mass. 1905)).
See id. at 50.
Id.
Id. at 51.
See id. at 55.
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which was not in the record. A 273-page private placement memorandum (offering
mortgage-backed securities to potential investors) was produced, but U.S. Bank could
not produce any mortgage schedule identifying the Ibanez loan among the mortgages
included. In addition, U.S. Bank never furnished any evidence that the entity allegedly
assigning the mortgage to U.S. Bank – the Structured Asset Securities Corporation – ever
held the mortgage.18 In the LaRace case, there was no document in the record reflecting an assignment of the LaRace mortgage by Option One, the original entity, to
Bank of America. There was an unexecuted copy of a mortgage loan purchase agreement, which purported to transfer the pooled mortgages from Bank of America to
ABFC. However, although the agreement makes reference to a schedule listing the assigned mortgage loans, that schedule was not a part of the trial court record. Wells
Fargo submitted a schedule that it represented to identify the assigned loans, but it
contained no property addresses, names of mortgagors, or any number that corresponded to the loan number or servicing number of the LaRace property.19
Two concurring justices wrote of the “utter carelessness with which the plaintiff
banks documented the titles to their assets.”20 The justices did not call into question
the fact that the mortgagors of the properties in question had defaulted on their obligations. However, the justices expressed that prior to commencing a foreclosure
action:
the holder of an assigned mortgage needs to . . . ensure that his
legal paperwork is in order. Although there was no apparent actual
unfairness here to the mortgagors, that is not the point. Foreclosure
is a powerful act with significant consequences, and Massachusetts
law has always required that it proceed strictly in accord with the
statutes that govern it.
The justices noted that this is particularly true in a state such as Massachusetts, which
permits foreclosure without judicial supervision.21
A second case of this type, Bank of New York v. Raftogianis,22 was decided by the
Superior Court of New Jersey last year. The Bank of New York brought an action to
foreclose on a mortgage taken out by Michael Raftogianis and Roman Krywopusk,
who had borrowed $1,380,000 from American Home Acceptance, with the debt memorialized by a note and mortgage executed on September 30, 2004. The mortgage
described the “Lender” as American Home Acceptance. There was also mention of
the Mortgage Electronic Registration System (“MERS”), which is a private corporation which administers a national electronic registry of mortgage interests and servicing rights in mortgage loans.23 In the mortgage, MERS was described as “a separate
corporation that is acting solely as a nominee for Lender and Lender’s successors and
assigns.”24 The mortgage was recorded with the county clerk on October 20, 2004.25
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See id. at 46-47, 52.
See id. at 48, 52.
See id. at 55-56 (Cordy, J., concurring, with whom Batsford, J., joined).
See id.
13 A.3d 435 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2010).
See id. at 442, 440.
Id. at 442.
See id.
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American Home Mortgage subsequently sold its interests in a group of mortgage
loans to American Home Mortgage Securities, LLC. The Mortgage Loan Purchase
Agreement that effectuated this transaction contemplated an additional transfer of
these mortgage loans to the American Home Mortgage Investment Trust 2004-4
Mortgage Backed Notes, Series 2004-4. The court found that the note and mortgage
were securitized without notice to the borrowers.26
The court’s description of this transaction, and the documents that accomplished
it, presents a picture of complexity that makes the foreclosure process essentially inaccessible to many mortgagors. The description also suggests confusion and lax procedures operating to the detriment of mortgagors.
In or about December 2004, a group of mortgage loans held by
American Home Acceptance were securitized. While the court is
now satisfied that defendant’s loan was among that group . . . , that
was not at all clear from the documents initially submitted by
plaintiff . . . . The securitization of the loan was not referenced in
the [foreclosure] complaint, or even in plaintiff’s initial motion for
summary judgment. (Judges and lawyers who regularly handle
foreclosure litigation would probably recognize that the matter involved a loan which had been securitized just from the description
of plaintiff in the complaint, such as “The Bank of New York as
Trustee for American Mortgage Investment Trust 2004-4 Mortgage
Backed Notes, Series 2004-4.” There is no apparent reason, however, why a layperson not familiar with the securitization process
would recognize that.) . . .
The documents provided in this case are typical of those presented
in other matters involving the securitization of mortgage loans.
Those documents are lengthy, complex, and difficult to understand. Included in the materials ultimately provided was a
Mortgage Loan Purchase Agreement, an Amended and Restated
Trust Agreement, an Indenture, and a Servicing Agreement. (The
Indenture in this case is in excess of 100 pages, without attachments. An attachment which simply defines the terms used in the
Indenture itself contains fifty-five pages.) . . . The transfers or assignments of the underlying mortgage loans involve other
complexities.27
Raftogianis and Krywopusk defaulted on the mortgage in October, 2008. The
complaint to foreclose was filed on February 9, 2009. The complaint stated that the
Bank of New York became owner of the note and mortgage “before the . . . complaint
was drafted.” The complaint did not refer to the securitization of the loan, any of the
entities involved in the securitization process, or any transfer from either American
Home Acceptance or MERS. The complaint also provided no information as to who
was then in physical possession of the note. Krywopusk filed an answer, counterclaim,

26
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See id. at 443, 437.
See id. at 443.
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and cross claim on May 6, 2009.28 After the complaint to foreclose was filed, an
“Assignment of Mortgage” was executed from MERS to the Bank of New York, as
Trustee. The assignment referred to the mortgage securing the Raftogianis/Krywopusk
note.29
The Bank of New York moved for summary judgment in January, 2010. “The motion was based on a certification from plaintiff’s counsel providing copies of the note,
the mortgage, and the February 2009 [post-complaint] assignment.”30 The subsequent
struggle to determine the rudimentary facts of the chain of transactions was described
by the court:
Defendant filed written opposition, challenging the validity of the
MERS assignment. Plaintiff responded with a certification executed by a supervisor for American Home Mortgage Servicing Inc.,
the servicer for the loan. While that . . . recited that the note and
mortgage had previously been sold to plaintiff, it did that in conclusory terms. No additional documentation was provided.
Neither plaintiff’s motion nor plaintiff’s reply to defendant’s opposition addressed the securitization of the debt, or the transfer or
negotiation of the underlying note. The court then required the
production of the documents executed as a part of the securitization process. The motion was adjourned.31
The court’s subsequent frustration with Bank of New York’s inability to document
the relevant transactions continued, amidst a flurry of document production and conflicting claims about the possibility of producing relevant documentation. In the end,
the Bank of New York never established that it had possession of the Raftogianis/
Krywopusk note as of the date that the foreclosure action was filed.32
Since physical possession of the note was required (under New Jersey law) to commence a foreclosure action, the court held that the Bank of New York failed to establish that it had the right to initiate the action. It further held that establishment of
later possession could not retroactively rectify the situation. The court emphasized
that “[t]he date of filing can affect substantive rights, and those involved should have
the ability to confirm that filing was proper.”33 For instance, under New Jersey law, “a
debtor’s right to cure a default with respect to a residential mortgage, without being
responsible for the lender’s fees and costs, will end when the complaint is filed. . . .
Similarly, . . . [New Jersey law] provides that certain borrowers facing foreclosure have
the right to a six month forbearance, effective with the filing of a foreclosure
complaint.”34
The court held that “[p]laintiff was required to establish one basic fact – that as of
the time the complaint was filed, it or its agent did have possession of the note on
which the action was based.”35 The burden of proof on this issue rested with the Bank
28
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See id. at 442, 445.
See id. at 445.
See id.
See id. at 445-46.
See id. at 452.
See id.
Id.
Id. at 459.
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of New York. Having failed in its proof, the foreclosure complaint was dismissed
without prejudice. Any new complaint would have to be accompanied by a certification confirming that the Bank of New York was then in physical possession of the
original Raftogianis/Krywopusk note.36
In a later case, Wells Fargo Bank v. Ford,37 the Superior Court of New Jersey ruled
against a purported assignee of a mortgage on similar facts. In that case, Sandra Ford
borrowed $403,750 from Argent Mortgage Company and gave a mortgage on her
residence in Westwood, New Jersey, to secure the loan. Five days later, Argent purportedly assigned the mortgage and note to Wells Fargo Bank. When Ford allegedly
stopped making payments about one year later, Wells Fargo brought a court action to
foreclose on the property. Ford, appearing pro se, responded that Argent committed
predatory and fraudulent acts in connection with the loan and mortgage, and that the
assignment to Wells Fargo was invalid.38
Wells Fargo subsequently brought a motion for summary judgment. Ford filed a
cross motion for summary judgment, alleging that documents produced by Wells
Fargo in the litigation were forgeries, and that she had been overcharged more than
$20,000 in closing costs at the time of closing.39
The Superior Court held that Wells Fargo failed to establish its standing to pursue
the foreclosure action. Under New Jersey law, “‘[a]s a general proposition, a party
seeking to foreclose a mortgage must own or control the underlying debt.’”40 In this
case, Wells Fargo could produce no endorsement of the Ford note by Argent to Wells
Fargo. In addition, there was no certification by a Wells Fargo officer that, on the basis
of personal knowledge, Wells Fargo was the holder and owner of the note. A purported assignment of the mortgage which was produced “was not authenticated in
any manner; it was simply attached to a reply brief.”41 Absent such proof, Wells Fargo
could not foreclose.
The final case in this cluster was decided by the Supreme Court of New York last
year. In this case, Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. McRae,42 Terry McRae borrowed $45,000 from First Franklin, a Division of National City Bank of Indiana, in
July, 2006. This debt was memorialized by a note and was secured by a mortgage on
McRae’s real property in Almond, New York.43
McRae allegedly defaulted on the loan and Deutsche Bank commenced a foreclosure action on January 21, 2009. Deutsche Bank made an application for an order of
reference, which was denied by the Supreme Court. The ground cited was Deutsche
Bank’s “fail[ure] to submit evidence of the proper assignment or delivery of the
Mortgage and/or Note.”44

36

See id.
15 A.3d 327 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2011).
38 See id. at 328.
39 See id.
40 See id. at 329 (quoting Raftogianis, 13 A.3d 435).
41 See id. at 331.
42 894 N.Y.S.2d 720 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010).
43 See id. at 720.
44 See McRae, 894 N.Y.S.2d. at 721. See also N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 1321 (Consol. 1963) (allowing
plaintiff to request an Order of Reference in the event that a defaulting borrower does not file an appearance within the time allotted, which sends the foreclosure case to a referee to determine the full amount
owed by the borrower, if the property can be sold as one parcel, etc.).
37
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The court described how, under New York law, a plaintiff in a foreclosure action
“must establish the existence of the mortgage and mortgage note, ownership of the
mortgage, and the defendant’s default in payment . . . .”45 “A mortgage can be assigned in two ways – by the delivery of the bond and mortgage . . . to the assignee with
the intention that all ownership interests [are] thereby transferred, or by a written instrument of assignment.”46 Neither was demonstrated in this case. There was no
proof offered that Deutsche Bank held the note and mortgage when the action was
commenced. In the alternative, the written assignment on which Deutsche Bank relied
was defective. Although the assignment purportedly assigned the mortgage, it did not
assign the underlying obligation. When the court indicated that this situation was
insufficient, Deutsche Bank submitted a new copy of the note, “which for the first
time contained an endorsement by First Franklin . . . to First Franklin Financial
Corporation, and an endorsement in blank by First Franklin Financial Corporation.”
However, this endorsement in blank was undated. “In stark contrast,” the court wrote,
“the copy of the Note attached to the complaint bears no such endorsements.
Obviously, the endorsements were made in response [to the court’s order] . . . , which
post-date the commencement of this case . . . , and are ineffective” to ground the filing
of the action.47
In dismissing the case, the court explained the policy reasons for its action:
[t]oday, with multiple (and often unrecorded) assignments of
mortgage obligations and multiple securitizations often related to
the same debt, the courts should carefully scrutinize the status of
parties who claim the right to enforce these mortgage obligations.
For the unrepresented homeowner, the issues of standing and real
party in interest status of the foreclosing party are never considered. Without such scrutiny, there is a risk that the courts will give
the judicial ‘seal of approval’ to foreclosures against unrepresented
homeowners who have little, if any, understanding of these issues,
much less the legal significance [of them] . . . .48

III. Pointless Procedural Hurdles or the Protection of
Substantive Rights?
Before assessing the desirability of the Ibanez decision and the others like it, we
posit several preliminary points. First, in none of these decisions were the foundational legal principles on which they turned anything surprising or new. In each case,
the court simply applied long established principles – such as the idea that a foreclosing party must have a present legal right to do so – in reaching the decision that it
reached. In no area of the law can a party bring an action, claiming breach of a contract under which it has no present legal rights. Requiring that claimed mortgage assignees or securitization trustees must actually possess the mortgage interests that
they assert is simply the implementation of a routine legal principle.
Second, the fact that traditional legal rules support a particular result does not, of
course, mean that those rules cannot be altered in particular contexts by courts. That
45
46
47
48

Id. at 722.
Id.
Id. at 723 (emphasis deleted).
Id. at 724.
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is, essentially, what the foreclosing parties in these cases requested. Although decades
of law might require – on its face – the dismissals of these actions, the foreclosing parties argued that the complexities of mortgage securitization and multiple assignments
in blank require flexibility in the enforcement of what are essentially hyper-technicalities in this context. The law in these states might require that the foreclosing party
have a written assignment or actual, physical possession of the mortgage or indebtedness note. However, there was no real dispute in any of these cases that the foreclosing
parties were – with the exception of some missing paperwork – the parties who were
entitled to do so.
Finally, there was no evidence in any of these cases that the property owners had
not, in fact, defaulted. In all of these cases, the property owners implicitly conceded
that they had stopped making payments, often for substantial periods. If there was
unfairness in the bringing of these foreclosure actions, it was not rooted in the factual
question of default.
Indeed, one could argue, all that was accomplished in these cases was a temporary
delay of the inevitable. In each of these cases, the complaint was dismissed by the
court without prejudice, meaning that the case could be re-filed. The foreclosing parties could simply cure the technical defect – obtain the written assignment or find the
missing documents – and file for foreclosure again.
Are there – therefore – any valid reasons for the decisions in these cases?
There are, in fact, several important principles that these decisions embody – principles that are critical to the law in this area, and broader questions of public policy.
A. A home mortgage deals with shelter; as a result, it is a particular
kind of contract that is imbued with particularly important
social issues and imperatives.

In the Ibanez case and at least one other,49 the mortgages that were threatened with
foreclosure were on the debtors’ homes. The individual and societal importance of
individuals’ homes has always been recognized in American law and policy. It is recognized in bankruptcy laws, income tax laws, property tax rates, federal mortgage lending standards, and a myriad of other contexts. In the Ibanez case, the court explicitly
recognized this factor. It stressed that the securitization of mortgages does not justify
carelessness in foreclosure procedures; those mortgages still convey “legal title to
someone’s home or farm, and must be treated as such.”50 In the McRae case, the court
cited mortgage reform legislation in New York in support of its decision. This legislation stated, explicitly, that “‘it is the expressed policy of the state to preserve and
guard . . . the social as well as the economic value of home ownership.’”51
The foreclosure crisis of the past three years has certainly intensified awareness of
the importance of fairness in residential loans, and the individual and societal costs of
loss of home ownership. However, the underlying principle–of the importance of human shelter–has long informed our nation’s public policy, and the law’s treatment of
foreclosure.

49
50
51

See Ibanez, 941 N.E.2d at 46, 47, 52; Ford, 15 A.3d at 328.
Ibanez, 941 N.E.2d at 51-52.
McRae, 894 N.Y.S.2d at 721 (quoting N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 265-a(1)(b) (Consol. 2007)).
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B.	In foreclosure actions – particularly those that involve
multiple assignments and securitized loans – the burden of
proof regarding the right to foreclosure must be placed on the
foreclosing party.

The Ibanez and similar cases discussed here all illustrate two basic truths: (1) complex real estate transactions with multiple (and often undocumented) assignments
and the securitization of thousands of mortgages are beyond the assumed understanding of any layperson; and (2) as a result, proof of these transactions, and the
claimed right to foreclose, must lie with the foreclosing party.
The complexities of the transactions involved in this cluster of cases, and the seeming attitude (of the financial institutions involved) that property owners need not be
made aware of them, are not unique; they are currently rife throughout the industry.
During the past decade, when mortgage lending became a scramble for quick profits
by loan originators who had no intention of holding and servicing loans, documentation of the millions of assignments and securitizations involved has been by-and-large
abysmal. The problems that were present in these cases – missing documents, assignments in blank, unrecorded assignments, post-transaction documentation, and others – have been discovered in foreclosure challenges in many states, and have been the
subject of many critical court opinions.
With such rampant problems, the approach that was taken in Ibanez and the other
cases is the only one that is sensible: the burden of proving the right to foreclose must
be placed on the foreclosing party. If a remote assignee or securitization trustee claims
the right to foreclose, it must prove the legal basis for that claim. It cannot be the case
that a remote party can claim the right to foreclose, with the property owner then
forced to disprove its entitlement to that action. All of the documents and other
knowledge of complex transactions are (to the extent that they exist) in the possession
of the foreclosing party. As a result, as a practical matter – as well as a matter of fairness – the burden of proving the right to foreclose must be borne by the foreclosing
party.
Granting the property owner an entitlement to proof of the transactions involved
is, of course, only as good as his ability to enforce it. This leads to the third important
principle in this context:
C.	In cases involving multiple assignments and/or securitized
loans, judicial oversight of the foreclosure process is critical.

In mortgage foreclosure cases involving multiple assignments and securitized
loans, a property owner who receives notice of foreclosure from a remote third party
or securitization trustee is placed in an impossible situation. Is this party, from whom
notice is received, the one actually (legally) entitled to foreclose? If not, and the foreclosure proceeds, the property owner might well remain liable (under the terms of the
loan) to the legally entitled party. With whom should the property owner deal, in raising defenses or seeking modification of loan terms under state or federal mandatory
mediation or foreclosure protection programs?
To ensure answers to such questions, and to implement mandatory mediation
laws, judicial oversight of the foreclosure process is critical. For instance, in response
to the foreclosure crisis, several states have enacted statutes that mandate negotiations
between property owners and mortgage holders in an attempt to avert foreclosure. In
New York, a new statute requires that a court hold a mandatory conference before
foreclosure on high-cost or sub-prime home loans, with the purpose being “to allow
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the parties to reach agreement on an alternative to foreclosure.”52 In Maine, recent
legislation has created the Foreclosure Mediation Program, which provides a defaulting borrower with the opportunity to enter into negotiations with the lender, supervised by a trained and impartial mediator, in which loss-mitigation strategies and the
possibility of avoiding the foreclosure action are discussed.53
Attempts by property owners to negotiate settlements and avoid foreclosure have
been stymied repeatedly by the claims of remote third parties and loan servicers who
claim that they have no authority to negotiate. To force production of proof of the
right to foreclose, and to require good faith participation by lenders in negotiation,
judicial oversight is critical. In addition, the obligation to invoke judicial oversight of
the foreclosure process should rest with the foreclosing party. The property owner,
with generally little information and less expertise, should not be in the position of
having to hire a lawyer to stop the foreclosure process and invoke the court’s protection. If a remote assignee or securitization trustee desires to foreclose, it should be
required to file a court action to do so.
The logic behind this principle is obvious in those jurisdictions that require judicial
supervision and approval of all foreclosure actions. However, it is not traditionally a
part of the law in those jurisdictions that do not require a claimed mortgage holder to
submit to the judicial process. In the approximately 29 “non-judicial foreclosure”
states, a mortgage holder is empowered to proceed to foreclosure and sale if the mortgage grants the lender that power. Since “non-judicial sale” is a mortgage term that
homeowners are very unlikely to appreciate, or feel that they can negotiate, it is safe
to assume that most mortgage loans in those states grant lenders that power. Indeed,
in the cases of the Ibanez and LaRace loans, the properties were foreclosed and sold
prior to any judicial involvement. Judicial scrutiny of the foreclosures in those cases
occurred only because – months after the sale – the purported mortgage holders chose
to initiate quiet title actions. Had they not done so, it is highly unlikely that proof of
the right to foreclose, required by the Ibanez court, would ever have been required.54
“Non-judicial foreclosure” statutes are based on the assumption that mortgage
foreclosures are relatively simple affairs between two contracting parties, with relatively simple facts about payment. This might have described most residential mortgage transactions twenty years ago. However, in the world of real estate financing in
the twenty-first century, this model reflects none of the realities of most transactions.
To give claimed mortgage holders the right to foreclose and sell the properties – unless
homeowners can guess that the foreclosing party is unauthorized, and know that they
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See McRae, 894 N.Y.S.2d at 249 (discussing N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 3408 (Consol. 2008)).
See 14 Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 14, § 6321-A, 6322 (2009). Pursuant to Maine’s Foreclosure Mediation
Program, if the borrower chooses to initiate the mediation process, no judgment authorizing the foreclosure and sale of the property can be entered until the mediator’s report is completed and filed with the
court. If the parties are unable to come to come to terms with a strategy to avoid further proceedings during mediation, the ensuing mediator’s report reflects that an agreement could not be reached and the court
may then enter a judgment of foreclosure in favor of the lender. Similar legislation has been enacted in
several other states. See, e.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 3408 (Consol. 2008); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 244, § 35A (2008);
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 46:10B-50 (2009).
54 In Massachusetts, a solution has been sought for at least one subset of loans, sub-prime loans. The
Massachusetts Attorney General and Massachusetts courts have attempted to force pre-sale negotiation
in the case of sub-prime loans for individual homes, by labeling them “presumptively unfair” and the
product of deceptive trade practices in violation of general consumer protection statutes. See
Commonwealth v. Fremont Inv. & Loan, 897 N.E.2d 548 (Mass. 2008).
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have the right to negotiation, and can afford to hire an attorney to file in court – is
unrealistic in today’s world and represents poor public policy.
Naysayers will point out that long foreclosure delays characterize the current situation in some states which require judicially approved foreclosures. Because of the
spiraling number of defaults on mortgage loans in the past three years, delays in accomplishing foreclosures in New Jersey and New York, for instance, now exceed an
average of three years.55 This has, in turn, depressed prices for the sales of non-distressed properties and created blocks of blight in some cities.56 Judicial review of
foreclosures is, however, only part of the problem; other causes include the disorganization of assignment and securitization records, and uncertainty about foreclosure
rules on both the state and federal levels.57 In addition, disputes about responsibility
for deteriorating homes in the process of foreclosure mirrors problems in the foreclosure process itself. In Los Angeles, the City has sued Deutsche Bank, “one of the
country’s largest trustees of mortgage-backed securities, seek[ing] hundreds of millions of dollars in penalties.” The Bank is accused of “illegally forcing out tenants,
allowing others to live in deplorable conditions and letting scores of empty homes
devolve into havens for gang members, squatters and drug dealers.” The Bank’s defense? The City has sued the wrong party. “Loan servicers, not Deutsche, which is the
trustee for the properties, are responsible for the maintenance of the properties, said
[a Deutsche] spokesman . . . .”58
There are potential costs to any course of action. The question is whether the efficiency of non-judicial foreclosures in moving foreclosed properties justifies the costs
that come with rapid, non-supervised foreclosure powers exercised by alleged thirdparty assignees and securitization trustees. The better answer is that it does not.

IV. Conclusion
Neither Ibanez, nor any of the other cases discussed here, forbids mortgage securitization, multiple mortgage and note assignments, or other complex real estate financing transactions. Indeed, the Ibanez court itself stressed that a securitization
trustee could be shown as a proper assignee if there is a trust agreement which clearly
and specifically identifies the mortgage at issue as among those assigned to the trust.59
The issue is not the blanket forbidding of complex transactions; it is the protection of
all rights, including those of the property owner, when default and foreclosure are
claimed.

55 See, e.g., Julie Schmit, Housing Market Recovery Could Be Stalled: Researcher Cites Foreclosure
Delays, Which Give Troubled Borrowers Prolonged Time in Homes, USA Today, July 14, 2011, at 2A.
56 See id.; see also Brady Dennis, There Goes the Foreclosed-on Neighborhood, The Portland
Press Herald, July 1, 2011, at A2.
57 See Schmit, supra note 55.
58 See Dennis, supra note 56.
59 See Ibanez, 941 N.E.2d at 53.

